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1. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the businessman who enters into contract negotiations with 
the purpose of gaining otherwise confidential knowledge about a 
competitor’s trade practices. Is he liable to pay the other party’s 
negotiation costs when the negotiations are broken off? The question is 
answered differently in domestic legal systems and it is understandable 
that one might attempt to classify the situation as either a contractual one 
or one of tort.1 The problem of such a binary view is often that “[…] the 
parties are no longer strangers to each other as presumed by tort law, nor are they parties 
to a contract which contract law requires to trigger all the rights and duties […]”,2 
hence a third alternative way is used in some legal systems.3 The inherent 
conundrums of precontractual liability are familiar in most domestic legal 
systems, but they also turn overly complex if the parties are located in each 
their jurisdiction. This article analyses whether the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) 
governs any precontractual questions. Precontractual liability under the 
CISG has been discussed sparsely in the literature and since the 
Convention neither expressly deals with nor excludes precontractual 
liablity it leaves a gap of knowledge. A further examination of the 
Convention’s applicability to precontractual liability, what the legal 
foundation of such precontractual duties may be, and what such duties 
may consist of is desired. 
Some authors have relied upon Art. 16(2) CISG as a basis for also 
imposing precontractual liability under the CISG.4 For instance, accepting 
a wrongfully revoked offer and hereafter claiming damages could arguably 
be impractical under certain circumstances. Imagine the following 
scenario: The offeror has offered to buy machinery at a certain price and 
promised to hold the offer open for two months, giving the offeree time 
to start the process of designing the machinery to determine whether it 
would be possible to sell it at the offered price. If the offeror then revokes 
the offer before the expiry of the two months, the offeree would already 
have had expenses, but would not yet be ready to accept the offer since 
                                                        
1 Hans Henrik Edlund, ‘Culpa in Contrahendo: Tortious Liability, Breach of Contract or 
an Autonomous Legal Instrument?’. European Business Law Review 30, no. 5 (2019), 
815-822.; Ingeborg Schwenzer, Pascal Hachem and Christoffer Kee, Global Sales and 
Contract Law (1. Edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 275. 
2 Schwenzer/Hachem/Kee, Global Sales (n 1) 275. 
3 This is the approach in Germany, according to Schwenzer/Hachem/Kee, Global Sales 
(n 1) 283. 
4 Silvia Gil-Wallin, ‘Liability Under Pre-Contractual Agreements and Their Application 
Under Colombian Law and the CISG’ Nordic Journal of Commercial Law (2007/1) 19-
20; Diane Madeline Goderre ‘International Negotiations Gone Sour: Precontractual 
liability under the United Nations Sales Convention’ 66 U. Cincinnati Law Review 1997 
258-281, 281;John O. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United 
Nations Convention (3rd edn. Kluwer Law International 1999) 167-168. 
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the designing and examination process is not yet completed.5 An 
acceptance of the offer would require further expenses for the offeree in 
order to finish the designing and examination process to a level where the 
offeree would be able to accept the offer at the offered price. These 
expenses may or may not be compensated after having pursued a damage 
claim through a lawsuit.6 The offeree would then be in the unfortunate 
situation of having to choose between stopping the process with a loss or 
continue the process with increased expenses risking not being able to be 
reimbursed for these expenses through a lawsuit. It may be argued that 
the CISG in a situation like this provides no effective remedy, leaving a 
gap in the CISG. This gap may be filled by settling the matter in 
accordance with Art. 7(2) CISG by giving the offeree the remedy of 
claiming damages directly for wrongful revocation of the offer.7 This 
would arguably be in line with the protection provided for in Art. 71 and 
72 CISG, regarding anticipatory breach, although these provisions would 
not be directly applicable unless a contract has been concluded.8 In this 
scenario the CISG encompasses precontractual liability since it provides 
for damages although no contract has been concluded. However, 
precontractual liability often denotes more than this single example and 
comprises any prior negotiations not necessarily involving offer and 
acceptance.9 The precontractual liability that may be based upon Art. 16(2) 
CISG and its analogical application may still be limited. Hence, the 
question arises whether there is support elsewhere in the CISG for 
establishing precontractual liablility or whether the matter is excluded 
altogether leaving aside the one example described above. 
It may be argued that the precontractual liability that may be derived 
from Art. 16(2) reaches further than mere liability for wrongful revocation 
of an offer. It may also be argued that this protection might extend to 
negotiations and the withdrawal from them due to the similarities between 
these situations. If a party relies upon the negotiations and suffers a loss 
when the other party withdraws, it may be unjustified for the other party 
to withdraw. The party withdrawing may then be held liable for the 
unjustified withdrawal from the negotiations.10 Imagine for example the 
situation where a party never intended to enter into a contract, but makes 
the proposition to contract only to gain access to confidential information, 
to distract or to make the other party make futile efforts. In that situation, 
a contract would never be concluded, and the aggrieved party may be left 
with a loss and in addition he may have granted the buyer access to 
                                                        
5 This example is constructed by Honnold in Honnold, Uniform Law (n 4) 167. 
6 Honnold, Uniform Law (n 4) 167. 
7 Honnold, Uniform Law (n 4) 168. 
8 Honnold, Uniform Law (n 4) 168, note 22. 
9 Albert H. Kritzer (ed.), Pre-Contract formation, available at:  Pace Law School Institute of 
International Commercial Law  
https://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/kritzer1.html (accessed 11 May 2020). 
10 Gil-Wallin, Liability (n 4) 19-20. 
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confidential information. Would an adjudicator be able to award the 
aggrieved party damages on the basis of precontractual liability in such 
situation? 
Taking into account that the purpose of the CISG is to remove legal 
barriers in international trade and to promote uniformity and certainty in 
international trade,11 it could be argued that it is in accordance with this 
purpose to let the scope of the CISG reach as far as possible and thereby 
encompass more aspects of precontractual liability. Since precontractual 
liability is dealt with very differently in the domestic laws of the different 
contracting states12 it would presumably promote uniformity and remove 
legal barriers if the CISG applied to the issue.  
In relation to domestic law, it has been noted that “[t]he existence and 
scope of pre-contractual duties depend on what stance a legal system takes towards the 
general principle of good faith.”13 This is similar to that of the CISG where good 
faith is relevant in two aspects. First, Art. 7(1) in which good faith is 
mentioned as a tool of interpretation. How Art. 7(1) is to be understood 
may affect the role of good faith and whether an analogical interpretation 
of Art. 16(2) CISG is allowed, thus forming a foundation for 
precontractual duties under the CISG. Second, if the precontractual 
liability is considered within the scope of the Convention in accordance 
with Art. 4 CISG, but without it being settled, Art. 7(2) permits the use of 
underlying principles. One of such principles could potentially be a 
principle of good faith and fair dealing. However, whether or not 
precontractual liability is even within the scope of the CISG is often 
overlooked in the debate,14 but is nonetheless crucial. 
Consequently, the analysis of the present paper is two-fold. First, it 
is analysed whether precontractual liability falls within the scope of the 
CISG. Second, presupposing that the answer to the first question is 
affirmative, it is analysed whether the notion of good faith in the CISG 
provides enough footing for the CISG to deal with more precontractual 
issues than the Art. 16-example explained previously. This paper 
predominantly focuses on establishing the legal foundation for 
precontractual liability under the CISG and does not seek to determine 
the effects of breaching precontractual duties in detail as this exceeds the 
limits of the paper. 
Furthermore, Art. 81(2) CISG and Art. 84 CISG could possibly 
provide a basis for some form of precontractual liability under the CISG, 
                                                        
11 See CISG Preamble and the UNCITRAL website ‘United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Vienna, 1980) (CISG)’ at 
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/salegoods/conventions/sale_of_goods/cisg (accessed 
11 May 2020). 
12 Lisa Spagnolo, ‘Opening Pandora’s Box: Good Faith and Precontractual Liability in 
the CISG, Opening Pandora's Box: Good Faith and Precontractual Liability in the CISG.’ 
21 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 2007 261–310, 282-283. 
13 Schwenzer/Hachem/Kee, Global Sales, p. 278. 
14 Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 293. 
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that does not necessarily require acts in bad faith or contrary to good faith.  
However, none of these provisions have been subject of independent 
study as good faith is presumed to be the most plausible road to include 
precontractual liablity under the Convention. 
2. SCOPE OF APPLICATION 
Before discussing any possible duty to act in good faith under the 
CISG it is paramount to determine whether the Convention may be 
extended to the precontractual phase, and thereby whether precontractual 
liability falls within the scope of the CISG. As mentioned previously this 
is an issue sometimes overlooked in scholarship.15 
Since precontractual liability is not expressly excluded by virtue of 
Art. 2-5 CISG16 it is relevant to consider whether the issue is encompassed 
by the wording ‘formation of the contract’ or ‘rights and obligations’ 
arising from such a contract in accordance with Art. 4 CISG. When 
formation of the contract is governed by the CISG the question might be 
asked: “Is not precontract formation a part of formation of the contract?”17 
It may be argued, that precontractual liability is outside the scope of 
the CISG, since there is no contract between the parties. The provisions 
that contain remedies in CISG Part III all appear to presuppose that a 
contract is concluded. Damages provided for in Art. 74 CISG, for 
instance, provides only for “damages for breach of contract”. It may, therefore, 
be argued that CISG Part III and the remedies contained therein do not 
apply unless a contract is concluded and that everything that happens prior 
to the conclusion is not really to be considered within the scope of the 
CISG18 leaving remedies on the basis of precontractual liability outside the 
scope of the Convention. In contrast, however, CISG Part II does apply 
to the determination of whether a proposal is sufficiently definite to 
constitute an offer19 and whether such offer has been accepted,20 and 
thereby whether a contract is in fact concluded.21 The CISG therefore also 
applies in some situations, although a contract may never have been 
concluded. Consequently, the precontractual phase could be governed by 
the CISG and a breach of precontractual duties could lead to damages 
following an analogical application of the Conventions rules in Part III 
and through application of underlying principles.  
According to the wording of Art. 4 CISG the Convention “governs 
only” the formation of the contract and the rights and obligations of the 
                                                        
15 Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 293. 
16 Camilla Baasch Andersen, Francesco G. Mazzotta, and Bruno Zeller, A Practitioner’s 
Guide to the CISG (1st edn. Juris 2010) 78. 
17 Kritzer, Pre-Contract Formation (n 9). 
18 Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 303 here referring to Schlechtriem in Workshop 230. 
19 CISG Art. 14. 
20 CISG Art. 18-19. 
21 CISG Art. 23. 
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parties arising from such. However, one could argue that the wording 
should be read as “governs without doubt”,22 since the CISG also contains 
provisions not directly related to formation of contracts or rights and 
obligations of the parties.23 As demonstrated above, some parts of the 
CISG applies also to situations where no contract is formed. Though the 
present authors are sceptical, one could argue that a more liberal 
interpretation of the wording of Art. 4 seems appropriate and that it 
therefore cannot be concluded that precontractual liability is excluded 
from the scope of the Convention merely from the wording of Art. 4 and 
the wording ‘formation of contract’. 
The close connection between negotiations and contract formation 
may make the issue of precontractual liability internal rather than external 
to the CISG.24 How close that connection is will however depend on the 
progress of the negotiations and it will be quite difficult to determine 
exactly when this connection is sufficiently close to make the issue internal 
to the CISG. 
When consulting the legislative history it is seen that the issue of 
precontractual liability was in fact considered. At the 8th session of the 
Working Group, a suggestion to include a provision that would give a 
party the right to claim compensation if the other party had violated a duty 
of care customary in the preparation of a contract was introduced:“In case 
a party violates the duties of care customary in the preparation and formation of a 
contract of sale, the other party may claim compensation for the costs borne by it.”25 
Delegates in favour found that it recognised duties on the parties 
prior to the conclusion of the contract and provided sanctions in case of 
violation. The majority of the delegates, however, were in opposition to 
this proposal and expressed the concern that the provision was too 
uncertain and might negatively affect the number of countries choosing 
to ratify the Convention.26 The suggestion was rejected at the 9th session 
of the Working Group.27 At the 1980 Diplomatic Conference the German 
Democratic Republic suggested to include a quite similar provision: 
“Where in the course of the preliminary negotiations or the formation of a contract a 
                                                        
22 Ingeborg Schwenzer (ed.) Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, Commentary on the UN Convention on 
the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (4th edn. Oxford University Press 2016) 74. 
23 Schlechtriem/Schwenzer, Commentary (n 22) 74. Here reference is made to Art. 7, 8, 9, 
11, 29 CISG. 
24 Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 298. 
25 UNCITRAL YB IX (1978), A/CN.9/SER.A/1978, 66, para. 70 reprinted in John O. 
Honnold, Documentary History of the Uniform Law for International Sales. The studies, deliberations 
and decisions that led to the 1980 United Nations Convention with introductions and explanations 
(Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers 1989) 298 
26 UNCITRAL YB IX (1978), A/CN.9/SER.A/1978, 67, paras. 84-85 reprinted in 
Honnold, Documentary History (n 25) 299. 
27 UNCITRAL YB IX (1978), A/CN.9/SER.A/1978, 67, para. 86 reprinted in Honnold, 
Documentary History (n 25) 299. 
8                      PRECONTRACTUAL LIABILITY IN THE CISG 
 
party fails in his duty to take reasonable care, the other party is entitled to claim 
compensation for his expenses”.28 
Some delegates supported the proposal,29 but a majority did not.30 
The delegates supporting the proposal considered the existing text to not 
sufficiently take into account the cases where no contract was concluded, 
but where one party might abuse its position and cause damage to the 
other party.31 Those in opposition considered it too far-reaching, and that 
it was yet another attempt to include the concept of good faith despite the 
lengthy discussions regarding this concept.32 This proposal was also 
rejected.33 Had any of the above mentioned provisions been included in 
the CISG, it would have contained an express reference to precontractual 
duties on the parties to act in good faith.34 As was the case with the general 
discussion on whether and how to include a good faith reference in the 
CISG, the delegates strongly disagreed on the question of precontractual 
liability in the CISG. The question of the application of the CISG to the 
precontractual phase, therefore, remains an open discussion. 
Notwithstanding the drafting history, the salient question is whether 
courts have subsequently considered precontractual liability to be a matter 
within the Convention’s scope. In a German court decision,35 the court 
had the opportunity to address the issue of precontractual liability in a 
contract governed by the CISG. The court decided that no contract had 
been concluded according to the CISG, and then decided whether the 
buyer had a claim under the domestic doctrine of ‘culpa in contrahendo’. 
The court did not explicitly establish that precontractual liability was 
outside the scope of the CISG, but this would appear to be implied since 
the court decided on this matter by recourse to domestic law with no 
further references to the CISG. The decision could indicate that the court 
found the issue clearly outside the scope of the CISG, but could as well 
be an expression of a homeward trend. When the court decided on the 
issue of contract formation the court decided the dispute upon the BGB36 
and stated: “This is consistent with the provisions of the CISG, which apply in the 
present case”.37 The court continued to make references to the BGB and 
                                                        
28 Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 272. 
29 United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, 
10 March-II April 1980, Official Records / UN DOC. A/CONF. 97/19, 294-295, paras. 
80, 84. 
30 A/CONF. 97/19 (n 29) 294-295, paras. 81, 82, 83, 85. 
31 A/CONF. 97/19 (n 29) 294-295, paras. 80, 84. 
32 A/CONF. 97/19 (n 29) 294-295, paras. 81, 85. 
33 A/CONF. 97/19 (n 29) 295, paras. 86, 87. 
34 Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 273. 
354 March 1994 Appellate Court Frankfurt, Germany case no. 10 U 80/93. 
36 German domestic contract law, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB). 
37 (n 35). Original German quote reads: “Dies stimmt mit der Regelung des Einheitlichen UN-
Kaufrechts (CISG) überein, das vorliegend Anwendung findet” available at 
http://www.unilex.info/cisg/case/205 (accessed 11 May 2020). 
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subsequently to the CISG thus openly admitting to a homeward trend. 
Consequently, the persuasive weight of the court decision is less. 
In a U.S. court decision,38 the court considered a contract to be 
governed by the CISG, but applied domestic law to determine whether 
one of the parties had claims arising from the precontractual phase. The 
court expressly debated the scope of CISG preemption, but found the 
CISG not to preempt claims based on promissory estoppel, except for 
those addressed by Art. 16(2)(b) CISG. The court also found claims based 
on negligence and negligent misrepresentation outside the scope of the 
CISG.  
In a Greek court decision,39 the court also considered the scope of 
the CISG and noted: “The issue of pre-contractual (established during the 
negotiations) liability, according to the opinion that this Court adopts, is not regulated 
by the CISG, except for the cases in which the CISG regulates specifically an issue for 
the period before the conclusion of the contract (e.g., CISG Article 16(2)).”  
As there does not seem to be case law where courts have applied the 
CISG to impose precontractual liability, it may be concluded that courts 
seem to find issues of precontractual liability, except for situations 
encompassed by Art. 16(2), outside the scope of the CISG. However, one 
should carefully consider whether the few court decisions available are 
subject to some degree of homeward trend. This seems in line with the 
general assumption that domestic courts prefer a narrow interpretation of 
the CISG.40 
The majority opinion among scholars is that precontractual liability 
falls outside the scope of the CISG,41 and some scholars even outright 
reject that precontractual liability is within the scope of the CISG without 
further discussion.42 A minority, on the other hand, is of the opposite 
opinion.43 One author has stated that the intention of the drafters of the 
CISG was to impose a duty of good faith on the parties that extends to 
the beginning of the negotiations,44 however when looking at the drafting 
history, this is hardly the case. Based on the preparatory works the CISG 
                                                        
38 Geneva Pharmaceuticals Technology Corp. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc. et al. / Apothecon, Inc. v. Barr 
Laboratories, Inc. et al. 10 May 2002 U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York [federal court of 1st instance], United States. 
39 Bullet-proof vest case 2009 Multi-Member Court of First Instance of Athens, Greece,  
Decision 4505/2009. English editorial analysis available at: 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/094505gr.html (accessed 11 May 2020). 
40 Joseph Lookofsky, ‘Not Running Wild with the CISG’ 29 Journal of Law and 
Commerce 2011, 143. 
41 For authors observing this divergence see Gil-Wallin, Liability (n 4) 14; Kritzer, Pre-
Contract Formation (n 9); Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 293. 
42 Andersen et al., Practitioner's Guide (n 16) 52; Christoph Brunner and Benjamin Gottlieb, 
Commentary on the UN Sales Law (CISG) (1st edn. Wolters Kluwer 2019) 119-120. 
43 For authors observing this divergence see Gil-Wallin, Liability (n 4) 14; Kritzer, Pre-
Contract Formation (n 9); Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 293. 
44 Gil-Wallin, Liability (n 4) 20. 
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was arguably not meant to encompass issues of precontractual liability, 
leaving this to be resolved by domestic law.45 The role of good faith was 
extensively discussed during the drafting as well as whether to include an 
express reference to precontractual liability. The delegates could not agree 
on such inclusion and deliberately left it out. The drafting of the CISG 
was however long and difficult. An amendment would equally be. It may, 
therefore, be argued that the legislative history should not carry much 
weight since the CISG is a living instrument that must evolve over time46 
to avoid that the Convention becomes “a prisoner of the past”.47 As the 
borders of the Convention are not always crystal clear many provisions 
are open-ended. The question of whether precontractual liability is within 
the Convention should be answered by applying the autonomous 
interpretation method mandated in Art. 7(1) and subsequently combined 
with Art. 7(2), that allows for gap-filling and development of the 
Convention.48 
The CISG reflects the society and available knowledge at the time of 
the drafting and not every possible development could have been taken 
into account, such as new electronic means of communication.49 The 
CISG must be able to adapt to meet these new circumstances, so as not 
to become ‘petrified’.50 However, some issues were in fact foreseen by the 
drafters. They were discussed and deliberately rejected. Precontractual 
liability is an example of such an issue.51 In these cases, it may be argued 
that it would be wrong to let the CISG expand in scope and to reintroduce 
such issues into the CISG.52 Expanding the scope of the CISG to 
encompass precontractual liability may, therefore, be “overstepping the spirit 
of the international consensus”.53 It was most likely the differences between 
common law and civil law approaches that were the reason why the 
drafters of the CISG could not agree to include a reference to 
precontractual liability.54 In regard to good faith in bargaining, there was 
not and there is currently no international common core of the concept.55 
It may be an oversimplicifcation to divide the approaches into civil law 
                                                        
45 Peter Schlechtriem, Uniform Sales Law - The UN-Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (Manz 1986) 57. 
46 Bruno Zeller, ‘The Observance of Good Faith in International Trade’ in André Janssen 
and Olaf Meyer, CISG Methodology (Sellier. european law publishers, 2009) 138. 
47 Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 288. 
48 Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 288. 
49 Andersen et al. Practitioner's Guide (n 16) 78-79; Schlechtriem/Schwenzer, Commentary  
(n 22) 133; Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 287. 
50 Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 288. 
51 Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 287. 
52 Andersen et al. Practitioner's Guide (n 16) 78. 
53 Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 287. 
54 Gil-Wallin, Liability (n 4) 13; Goderre, Negotiations (n 4) 266. 
55 Schwenzer/Hachem/Kee, Global Sales (n 1) 280-281; Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 
282-283. 
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and common law, as there are differences among the approaches to 
precontractual liablity among common law countries as well as among civil 
law countries. However, there are general differences between common 
law and civil law systems which makes this classification beneficial. While 
civil law systems generally have acknowledged a duty to act in good faith 
during negotiations as a basis for imposing precontractual liability,56 
common law systems have not acknowledged such a general duty during 
the negotiations. Common law countries have however moved towards 
acknowledging some precontractual duties.57 This development was still at 
its early stages at the time the CISG was drafted.58 Had the CISG been 
drafted today, then one may wonder if the delegates would have agreed to 
expressly include at least some precontractual duties. If one accepts that 
the CISG should be applied in a way that lets the Convention evolve and 
adapt to new circumstances, it could be argued that the scope of the CISG 
should be expanded to encompass at least some precontractual duties, at 
least to the extent that these may now be an expression of an international 
common core. 
When taking into account that the purpose of the CISG is to remove 
legal barriers in international trade and to promote uniformity and 
certainty in international trade,59 it is arguably in line with the purpose of 
the CISG to let the scope encompass some precontractual liability. 
Expanding the scope of the CISG to encompass precontractual liability 
would promote uniformity and predictability since the issue would be 
governed by a uniform law familiar to the parties rather than diverging 
domestic laws.60 If applying domestic law the result would likely be 
different in the various jurisdictions due to the different approaches in 
common law and civil law systems.61 The expansion of the scope of the 
CISG could in addition decrease transaction costs as the parties would not 
have to familiarise themselves with domestic laws on precontractual 
liability,62 which would be in accordance with the purpose of the CISG.63 
Theoretically, extending the scope of the CISG would improve 
                                                        
56 Goderre, Negotiations (n 4) 267. 
57 Goderre, Negotiations (n 4) 270; Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability (n 176) 222; 
Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 268. 
58 Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 268. 
59 See CISG Preamble and the UNCITRAL website ‘United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Vienna, 1980) (CISG)’ at 
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/salegoods/conventions/sale_of_goods/cisg (accessed 
11 May 2020). 
60 Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 281; Gil-Wallin, Liability (n 4) 18-19. 
61 Gil-Wallin, Liability (n 4) 18. 
62 Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 282. 
63 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, United Nations Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Vienna, 1980) (CISG),  
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/salegoods/conventions/sale_of_goods/cisg (accessed 
11 May 2020). 
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predictability and certainty, at least to the extent that the CISG preempts 
domestic law, so that the domestic law does not apply either exclusively 
or concurrently with the CISG.64 The fact that precontractual liability may 
be based on good faith and that the content of good faith has not yet been 
clearly defined in relation to the Convention may, however, bring 
uncertainty to the CISG and its application. Adjudicators may apply good 
faith differently and parties may therefore not be able to predict their legal 
status, and thus uniformity is not in fact promoted.65 If the CISG seems 
to be an unpredictable instrument to contracting parties, these parties may 
be more inclined to opt out of the CISG or less inclined to opt in.66 It may 
also affect the amount of non-Contracting States that will choose to 
become parties to the Convention in the future, as was also one of the 
concerns expressed when a proposal for an express inclusion of 
precontractual liability in the CISG was suggested during the drafting of 
the CISG.67 There is, however, no signs of States being reluctant to 
become parties to the Convention. On the contrary, an ever increasing 
amount of states either ratify the Convention of remove reservations made 
upon ratification. 
Those arguing in favour of an extensive interpretation, letting the 
CISG develop and expand in scope to obtain greater formal uniformity, 
rather than dwelling in the legislative history, must do so accepting greater 
uncertainty and thereby the risk of decreased substantive uniformity.68 On 
the other hand, opponents of such approach, in preferring predictability 
and certainty, will trade greater formal uniformity in favour of substantive 
uniformity and respect for the original compromise.69 Art. 7(1) CISG 
requires the interpreter to have regard for the need to promote uniformity 
“in its application”. This could indicate that the purpose of the CISG is to 
promote substantive uniformity within the sphere of the CISG, rather 
than in general to promote uniformity in all aspects of international trade. 
The CISG is a convention concerning international ‘sale of goods’. 
It is thereby concerned with sales law, not tort law. Precontractual liability 
is a liability resembling tort law while still being closely connected to 
contract law. Precontractual liability is a type of liability that in some legal 
                                                        
64 Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 282-283. However, alone the issue of determining 
whether and when the CISG preempts domestic law could cause uncertainty, despite that 
theoretically expanded uniformity is achieved, see Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 283. 
The question of preemption is beyond the framework of this article.  
65 Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 281, 283. 
66 Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 309-310. 
67 UNCITRAL YB IX (1978), A/CN.9/SER.A/1978, 67, para. 85 reprinted in Honnold, 
Documentary History (n 25) 299. 
68 Formal uniformity is regarded as a theoretical quantitative uniformity used to describe 
“the field of coverage of uniform law on paper”, whereas substantive uniformity is regarded as 
an actual uniformity used to describe “the quality of uniformity achieved within that field”, see 
Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 281. 
69 Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 289. 
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systems is characterized as a contractual liability, while in others it is 
considered tortious or a third unique type.70 Such differences in the 
domestic classifications should not be decisive of whether precontractual 
liability falls within the scope of the Convention, but perhaps it is 
contributing to the confusion as to whether it does.  
It becomes apparent that answering whether precontractual liability 
is considered within the scope of the CISG is not simple. Whether it will 
be considered within the scope will mainly depend on whether the 
legislative history is considered decisive, or whether instead the CISG is 
interpreted extensively and allowed to evolve to encompass such liability. 
However, even with an extensive interpretation, there must be limits as to 
how far the CISG scope may be allowed to expand. Part of the answer 
may lie in an analysis of whether the Convention can provide any footing 
for precontractual liability to exist. Such footing would most likely be 
found in the concept of good faith. 
3.  THE NOTION OF GOOD FAITH AS IMPOSING DUTIES ON 
THE PARTIES IN THE PRECONTRACTUAL STAGE 
Good faith in the Convention is a somewhat controversial topic. 
Good faith is mentioned merely once in the Convention text, in Article 7. 
Boiled down, it can be said that there are three approaches to good faith 
in the Convention. First, according to a literal understanding of Art. 7(1) 
the interpreter will find that the observance of good faith is only applicable 
to the interpretation of the Convention text. Consequently, the provision 
does not impose a direct duty on the parties.71  The interpreter may in this 
regard furthermore reject the perception that good faith is a general 
principle underlying the CISG.72 Second, the interpreter finds that good 
faith is an underlying principle to be used for gap-filling in accordance 
with Art. 7(2). 73 Third, Art. 7(1) is not to be understood literally, meaning 
that it imposes a duty directly on the parties.74 Which interpretation one 
prefers determines whether Art. 7 and good faith may be considered a 
basis for precontractual liability under the CISG. In essence, this is a 
question whether one adheres to a dynamic doctrine and how far one is 
willing to take it. For the purpose of determining whether precontractual 
liability has enough of a footing in the CISG it is necessary to explore the 
closely linked concept of good faith further.  
                                                        
70 Michael Joachim Bonell, ‘The law governing international commercial contracts and 
the actual role of the UNIDROIT Principles’ (Oxford University Press on behalf of 
UNIDROIT) 23 Uniform Law Review 2018, 15–41, 192, with note 55; 
Schlechtriem/Schwenzer, Commentary (n 22) 258; Schwenzer/Hachem/Kee, Global Sales 
(n 1) 283-284. 
71 Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 274. 
72 Goderre, Negotiations (n 4) 275-276. 
73 Goderre, Negotiations (n 4) 276-278; Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 274-275. 
74 Goderre, Negotiations (n 4) 278-280; Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 275-277. 
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3.1. GOOD FAITH THROUGH INTERPRETATION ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 
7(1) 
The black letter wording of Art. 7(1) CISG suggests that the good 
faith requirement only applies to adjudicators when they interpret the 
Convention text, but not to the relationship between the parties. However, 
the wording of Art. 7(1) is ambiguous as to how this interpretation is to 
be conducted. How should the adjudicator exactly interpret the provisions 
with regard to the need to promote the observance of good faith? 
Therefore, the question of whether Art. 7(1) additionally imposes a duty 
on the parties has been discussed.75  
As the wording of Art. 7(1) provides little guidance, one may consult 
the drafting history. In 1969 UNCITRAL established the Working Group 
that prepared a draft of the provisions that later became the CISG.76 At 
the 8th session of the Working Group, a direct duty on the parties to act 
in good faith in the course of the formation of the contract was 
suggested.77 At the 9th session of the Working Group and at the 11th 
session of the Commission this concept was discussed and some argued 
for deleting any reference to good faith, since it was vague and lacked 
sanctions and therefore would increase uncertainty, while others found it 
implicit and therefore unnecessary. Others again found good faith to be a 
well recognised principle and feared that leaving out a reference to good 
faith would send the wrong signals.78 The Commission established a 
second Working Group with the purpose of drafting a compromise of 
these different opinions.79 A draft was proposed that essentially equals 
what later became Art. 7(1) CISG. With that good faith was instead 
included as an interpretive concept, rather than a duty on the parties, as 
an attempt to find an acceptable compromise.80  This suggestion was the 
one presented at the 1980 Diplomatic Conference.81 At this conference, 
the delegates discussed the suggested article and two proposals for 
amendments.82 An Italian proposal to require the parties to observe the 
principles of good faith in the formation and performance of the 
                                                        
75 Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 274-279. 
76 Honnold, Documentary History (n 25) 3. 
77 UNCITRAL YB IX (1978), A/CN.9/SER.A/1978, 66, para. 70 reprinted in Honnold, 
Documentary History (n 25) 298. 
78 UNCITRAL YB IX (1978), A/CN.9/SER.A/1978, 66-67, paras. 73- 77, 35, paras. 44-
48 reprinted in Honnold, Documentary History (n 25) 298-299, 369. 
79 UNCITRAL YB IX (1978), A/CN.9/SER.A/1978, 36, para 55 reprinted in Honnold, 
Documentary History (n 25) 370. 
80 UNCITRAL YB IX (1978), A/CN.9/SER.A/1978, 36, paras. 56-60 reprinted in 
Honnold, Documentary History (n 25) 370. 
81 A/CONF. 97/19 (n 29) 5, Art. 6. 
82 A/CONF. 97/19 (n 29) 257-259, paras. 40-57. 
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contract83  and a Norwegian proposal to move the notion of good faith to 
what eventually became Art. 8(3) CISG84 were both rejected. Some 
delegates supported these proposals85 while other delegates, although 
some moderately supportive, would prefer the existing text of the article.86 
Some delegates found that although it would be desirable for parties to 
behave in good faith, they were unable to support the Italian suggestion 
since it was of uncertain meaning, dangerous in practice, and since it 
provided no sanctions in the event of failure to comply.87 Some delegates 
considered the proposals unnecessary as good faith was already 
understood to be an underlying principle implicit in any legal transaction88.  
The existing text had already been discussed at length by the UNCITRAL 
Working Group prior to the 1980 Diplomatic Conference, and the existing 
text represented a compromise.89 Due to the various opinions expressed 
by the delegates, no agreement could be reached on any of the proposals 
for amendments, and retention of the existing text was agreed upon.90  
Consequently, the drafting history is of little assistance in clarifying the 
concept of good faith in the CISG. 
While the delegates could not agree on an explicit inclusion of a duty 
on the parties to observe good faith, the delegates did not unanimously 
agree that this duty should not be imposed on the parties either. Even 
though the text of Art. 7(1) CISG appears to be a compromise, it rather 
masks the continuing disagreement among the drafters, and “this Pandora’s 
box gave the mere illusion of a compromise”.91 The discussion of whether this 
duty lies inherent within the CISG is therefore still open, although the 
existing text of Art. 7(1) does not explicitly impose a duty directly on the 
parties. 
In regard to the understanding of the notion of good faith, the 
legislative history is, as becomes apparent from the above, inconclusive. It 
has been argued that the preparatory works in general often are 
inconclusive and seldom provide the answer to complex issues.92  
Furthermore, it has been argued that the preparatory works are “frozen in 
time” while the CISG is a “living instrument”,93  to be understood in light of 
                                                        
83 A/CONF. 97/19 (n 29) 87, Italy (A/CONF.97/C.1IL.59). Interestingly this proposal 
was very similar to the one already suggested at the 8th session of the Working Group 
and rejected in the 11th session of the Commission. 
84 A/CONF. 97/19 (n 29) 87, Norway (A/CONF.97IC.1IL.28). 
85 A/CONF. 97/19 (n 29) 258, paras. 43-44. 
86 A/CONF. 97/19 (n 29) 258, paras. 45, 46, 48, 49, 52. 
87 A/CONF. 97/19 (n 29) 258, paras. 47, 50. 
88 A/CONF. 97/19 (n 29) 258-259, paras. 51, 53. 
89 A/CONF. 97/19 (n 29) 257-259, paras. 40, 45, 49, 50. 
90 A/CONF. 97/19 (n 29) 259, paras. 54-57. 
91 Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 273-174. 
92 Joseph Lookofsky, Understanding the CISG (5th edn. DJØF Publishing Copenhagen 
2017) 31. 
93 Zeller, Good Faith (n 46) 138. 
16                      PRECONTRACTUAL LIABILITY IN THE CISG 
 
current scholarly works and case law. Therefore, what the drafters 
discussed may generally carry little weight when assessing the 
understanding and extent of good faith,94  and other relevant sources must 
be consulted. 
Scholars have expressed varying views on the notion of good faith.95  
Although a duty on the parties to observe good faith is not expressly 
evident in Art. 7(1) CISG, it is advocated among some scholars that the 
good faith requirement in Art. 7(1), in addition to imposing a duty on 
adjudicators, also imposes a duty directly on the parties.96 Scholars 
advocating this view argue that the parties’ conduct and contract must be 
interpreted in accordance with the observance of good faith, either 
because the interpretation of the CISG and the contract is inseparable, or 
because Art. 7(1) is additionally directed at the parties as well as the 
adjudicator.97 Some scholars may not reach as far as to outright conclude 
that good faith may be imposed as a direct positive duty, but acknowledge 
that good faith reaches further than merely being an interpretive tool, and 
in addition, governs rights and obligations of the parties.98 In opposition 
other scholars have advanced a more narrow view of the wording of the 
provision’s text; “[i]n the interpretation of this Convention” which in connection 
with the drafting history of Art. 7 CISG entails that the requirement to 
observe good faith cannot be applied to the parties’ conduct, but merely 
to the interpretation of the CISG.99  
Regardless of the fact that it does not appear directly from the black 
letter wording of the CISG, the obligation to interpret the provisions with 
regard to the observance of good faith will ultimately influence the 
relationship between the parties. The obligation to interpret with regard 
to good faith must ultimately affect the obligations of the parties,100 as 
“good faith cannot exist in a vacuum and must be anchored to parties’ behaviour if used 
to interpret provisions”.101 Thereby, although a literal reading of Art. 7(1) 
CISG indicates that the good faith requirement only applies to the 
interpretation of the CISG, the concept of good faith may necessarily be 
                                                        
94 Zeller, Good Faith (n 46) 138. 
95 Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 274-279. 
96 Schlechtriem/Schwenzer, Commentary (n 22) 121 (not itself following this position). For 
a description of this view see Bonell, Art. 7, p. 84; Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 275-
277. 
97 Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 276. 
98 Zeller, Good Faith (n 46) 148. 
99 Camilla Baasch Andersen, ‘Good Faith? Good Grief!’ 17 International Trade and 
Business Law Review 2014 310-321, 317-318; Andersen et al., Practitioner's Guide (n 16) 
76; Farnsworth, Duties (n 124) 55-56; Schlechtriem/Schwenzer, Commentary (n 22) 126-
127; Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 274. 
100 Schlechtriem/Schwenzer, Commentary (n 22) 127; Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 278-
279. 
101 Andersen, Good Grief (n 99) 318. 
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linked to the parties’ behaviour.102 The extent of the notion of good faith 
is debatable, but many seem to support that good faith, in one way or 
another, to a greater or lesser extent, may reach beyond strict applicability 
only to the interpretation of the CISG.103 and will at least indirectly be 
linked to the parties’ behaviour and their obligations. 
When looking at court practice it appears that domestic courts most 
often impose a standard of behaviour on the contracting parties when 
good faith is utilized, rather than merely referring to good faith as an 
interpretive tool.104 This supports the view that good faith, at least to some 
extent, reaches beyond the mere interpretation of the CISG text. This 
could partly answer how exactly the adjudicator should interpret the 
provisions with regard to the need to promote the observance of good 
faith. The provisions must necessarily at least be interpreted in relation to 
the parties’ behaviour, rights and obligations, but may additionally impose 
a direct duty on the parties, either due to the good faith reference in Art. 
7(1) or possibly as an underlying principle of the CISG according to Art. 
7(2). Considering the debated and debatable concept of good faith in 
relation to Art. 7(1) CISG, the footing that one may find in Art. 7(1) to let 
a precontractual liablity develop seems to be an unstable one. If a proper 
leg-up is to be found, it could perhaps be in an underlying principle of a 
more flexible nature. 
It may be argued that if good faith is considered a general principle 
on which the CISG is based in the sense of Art. 7(2) CISG then the 
significance of whether Art. 7(1) imposes a duty directly on the parties or 
only imposes a duty on adjudicators might be lessened and has been 
referred to as an “arguably ‘academic’ distinction”.105 Whether good faith is an 
underlying principle on which the CISG is based is therefore also highly 
relevant in assessing whether Art. 7 and good faith may provide a basis for 
precontractual liability under the CISG. 
3.2. GOOD FAITH AS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 7(2) 
Art. 7(2) CISG demands that gaps in the convention be settled using 
the principles on which the CISG is based before resorting to any 
domestic law alternative. The question is now whether good faith is such 
a general principle, and whether it provides firmer ground for imposing a 
duty on the parties to observe good faith than good faith as an 
                                                        
102 Andersen, Good Grief (n 99) 317-318; Andersen et al., Practitioner's Guide (n 16) 76-77; 
Lookofsky, CISG (n 92) 36-37; Schlechtriem/Schwenzer, Commentary (n 22) 126-127; 
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103 Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 278-279. 
104 Thomas Neumann, ‘The Roots and Fruits of Good Faith in Domestic Court Practice’ 
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interpretative tool according to Art. 7(1) CISG. The wording of Art. 7(2) 
itself provides no guidance on how to determine the general principles, or 
whether good faith may be such. 
It may be a starting point to consult the legislative history to see 
whether it was discussed which principles may be considered underlying 
principles of the CISG, or at least how such principles should be derived. 
The UNCITRAL Working Group that prepared what eventually became 
Art. 7(1), did not draft Art. 7(2). What became Art. 7(2) was not suggested 
until the 1980 Diplomatic Conference. Bulgaria,106  Czechoslovakia,107  and 
Italy108 made proposals for a subsection (2), suggesting how to settle 
matters governed by, but not expressly settled in the CISG. The three 
proposals were all rejected and the German Democratic Republic 
suggested what essentially became Art. 7(2),109 and this proposal was 
adopted.110 During the discussions, the delegates favoured this proposal, 
although some were concerned that a reference to general principles was 
dangerous,111  that such would be difficult to discern,112  and that it might 
lead to excessive freedom in interpreting what those principles are.113  
There were no discussions among the delegates on how to derive such 
general principles,114 and the legislative history does therefore not provide 
any guidance in this regard. The delegates who rejected an express 
requirement for the parties to observe good faith or an express reference 
to good faith in what later became Art. 8(3) CISG expressed that the 
Convention already referred to general principles115 and that good faith 
was already to be understood as such principle.116 This may, therefore, 
support good faith as a general principle on which the CISG is based. 
While good faith is merely mentioned once in the CISG,117  which 
could lead to the impression that good faith does not constitute an 
underlying principle, the Secretariat itself referred to the observance of 
good faith as a ‘principle’ in The Secretariat Commentary118 and notes that 
                                                        
106 A/CONF. 97/19 (n 29) 87, Bulgaria (A/CONF.97/C.1IL.16). 
107 A/CONF. 97/19 (n 29) 87, Czechoslovakia (A/CONF.97/C.1IL.15). 
108 A/CONF. 97/19 (n 29) 87, Italy (A/CONF.97/C.1IL.59). 
109 A/CONF. 97/19 (n 29) 87, 256, paras. 25-26. 
110 A/CONF. 97/19 (n 29) 87, 257, para. 35. 
111 A/CONF. 97/19 (n 29) 255, para. 12. 
112 A/CONF. 97/19 (n 29) 256, para. 17. 
113 A/CONF. 97/19 (n 29) 257, para. 28. 
114 A/CONF. 97/19 (n 29) 254-257, paras. 1-37. 
115 A/CONF. 97/19 (n 29) 258, para. 51. 
116 A/CONF. 97/19 (n 29) 258-259, para. 53. 
117 Art. 7(1) CISG. 
118 There is no official commentary to the CISG, but the Secretariat Commentary to the 
1978 draft included in the Official Records, can provide guidance as to the understanding 
of the 1980 Convention text. It is, however, not a conclusive authority, since the 1978 
draft that was presented at the 1980 Vienna Conference was modified and therefore not 
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numerous of the provisions in the CISG are manifestations of the 
requirement to observe good faith.119 After listing several examples of 
provisions the Secretariat states that: “The principle of good faith is, however, 
broader than these examples and applies to all aspects of the interpretation and 
application of the provisions of this Convention.”120 This supports the view, that 
good faith is a principle on which the CISG is based.121 It must, however, 
be noted, that when the provision that later became Art. 7(1) was drafted, 
and the compromise on the good faith reference was first reached, the 
subsection that later became Art. 7(2) had not yet been suggested. 
Subsection (2) was first introduced at the 1980 Diplomatic Conference.122  
Therefore, the Draft that the Secretariat commented on in The Secretariat 
Commentary did not yet contain what later became Art. 7(2). The 
Secretariat did therefore not have this later provision in mind, and the 
applicability of general principles as a gap-filling mechanism when 
commenting on the Draft. The temporal disorder in which Art. 7(1) and 
7(2) were drafted has been referred to as contributing to “good faith’s 
phoenix-like quality”,123  which may have caused the uncertainty of the role 
of good faith. 
Some scholars reject good faith as a general principle124, by arguing 
that Art. 7 CISG only permits good faith to be consulted when 
interpreting the provisions of the CISG, but that “it is not a general principle 
in itself; certainly not one with the power and flexibility to determine outcomes of 
cases”.125 In support of this, it is argued that the drafting history of the 
CISG is clear to the extent that the drafters rejected good faith as a general 
principle,126  and that it would be “a perversion of the compromise to let a general 
principle of good faith in by the back door”.127 As mentioned above, the 
preparatory works does not explicitly list which principles are to be 
considered underlying principles, and it was not explicitly discussed 
whether good faith was such. It might not be correct to state that it is clear, 
that a general principle of good faith was outright rejected. The rejection 
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125 Andersen, Good Grief (n 99) 318. 
126 Andersen, Good Grief (n 99) 318. 
127 Farnsworth, Duties (n 124) 56. 
20                      PRECONTRACTUAL LIABILITY IN THE CISG 
 
of an express reference to good faith beyond the mere interpretation of 
the CISG does not necessarily make it clear, that good faith was not 
already inherent in the CISG itself, as also indicated by some of the 
delegates at the 1980 Diplomatic Conference.128  Furthermore, it has been 
argued that the search for general principles is not bound to the specific 
intent of the drafters, since this is not expressly required by Art. 7 itself. 
Art. 7(2) must rather be interpreted according to the broader purposes of 
the CISG as expressed in 7(1).129 It has also been argued, that the CISG is 
capable of adapting and that its underlying principles should be interpreted 
as being able to evolve with change.130 Again, the matter can be boiled 
down to which degree one adheres to a dynamic doctrine. 
Some scholars are not directly opposed to good faith as a general 
principle, but regard it as too vague and abstract to have any independent 
legal impact. Instead, more specific principles, such as a duty to 
communicate, which are more specific and therefore more suited to fill 
gaps, can be derived from the principle of good faith.131  
Many scholars, however, refer directly to good faith as a generally 
acknowledged underlying principle of the CISG.132 Sometimes defined 
negatively to exclude behaviour in bad faith, and sometimes considered 
having a positive role requiring behaviour in good faith.133  
The principle of good faith is sometimes derived from Art. 7(1),134 
but more often the principle is derived from numerous provisions of the 
CISG, that may be considered an expression of such.135 The latter may 
find more support in The Secretariat Commentary that refers to numerous 
provisions as manifestations of good faith.136 Good faith as an underlying 
principle also finds support in the UNCITRAL Case Law Digest, which 
refers to several court cases, in which courts have referred to ‘the principle 
of good faith’.137  A study of the utilisation of good faith additionally shows 
that when courts refer to good faith and when imposing a standard of 
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behaviour on the parties, the courts most often do so with reference to 
good faith being an underlying principle of the CISG.138 Among the 
diverging opinions on good faith as a general principle, this position, 
therefore, seems to be the most reasoned.  
When relying on good faith in the application of the CISG it must 
first be clarified whether one relies on an interpretation in accordance with 
Art. 7(1) or gap-filling in accordance with Art. 7(2). Arguably only a strict 
distinction provides for a correct application of the CISG.139 Art. 7 
contains three possible understandings of the extent of the notion of good 
faith. First, that Art. 7(1) is merely an interpretative tool, although 
indirectly affecting the obligations of the parties. Secondly, that Art. 7(1) 
imposes a direct duty on the parties to observe good faith. Thirdly, that 
Art. 7(2) provides for good faith being a general principle used for gap-
filling. If the adjudicator follows the first understanding, the interpretation 
with regard to good faith is naturally limited to the present provisions in 
the CISG. If the parties do not have a positive duty to act in good faith, 
beyond what appears from the present provisions, Art. 7(1) may not solely 
provide a basis for precontractual liability, but may only do so in 
combination with an interpretation of other provisions in the CISG, such 
as Art. 16(2) CISG. If on the other hand the adjudicator follows the 
second understanding, and thereby finds there to be a positive duty on the 
parties, the content of such duty is not expressly settled in the CISG and 
must therefore constitute a gap to be filled by virtue of Art. 7(2). If the 
adjudicator follows the third understanding, and thereby finds that good 
faith is a general principle underlying the CISG, the content of such 
principle must equally be settled. With this line of argument, it might be 
reasoned that regardless of which of the two latter understandings the 
adjudicator applies, the result of the given case might not differ. The two 
latter understandings both leave the door open to a broader perception of 
precontractual liability under the CISG than mere liability for wrongful 
revocation of an offer. This naturally provides that one accepts that 
precontractual liability may fall within the scope of the CISG in the first 
place as described further above. 
3.3. DETERMINING THE CONTENT OF THE POTENTIAL DUTY TO OBSERVE 
GOOD FAITH 
As the CISG aims to reach uniformity in practice it would be 
unproblematic to apply any rule that is already uniform across all domestic 
systems. However, there does not appear to be a common core of the 
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Negotiations (n 4) 278. 
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concept ‘good faith’ across domestic systems140  that one can rely on. If 
one were to find that there is a gap in the CISG in this regard, and that no 
underlying principles are capable of filling it, domestic law would instead 
settle it with diverging results. When gap-filling the adjudicator must not 
overlook the obligation in Art. 7(1) to interpret the CISG having regard 
to its international character and the need to promote uniformity.141 The 
adjudicator must therefore thoroughly search for underlying principles to 
fill the gap, or rather fill out the content of the concept of good faith, 
rather than resorting to the possibly diverging domestic laws.142 Only such 
approach will properly have regard for the international character of the 
CISG and promote uniformity.143 The role of UPICC, PECL and TLP in 
relation to underlying principles of the CISG is highly debated144 and the 
question essentially is to which degree these soft law instruments may 
assist in establishing the content of the duty to act in good faith. 
3.3.1 RELEVANCE OF SOFT LAW INSTRUMENTS 
First, a word of caution. UPICC, PECL and TLP have a wider scope 
and may also apply to issues not covered by the CISG. If an expression of 
an underlying principle is to be found thoroughly described in soft law 
rules, one may be inclined to apply such as part of the CISG without 
further consideration. It must, however, be remembered, that just because 
a provision might be an expression of an underlying principle of the CISG, 
it may only be used to fill a gap, if there is, in fact, a gap to fill. Utilising an 
underlying principle to determine whether an issue is within the scope of 
the CISG would entail the risk of expanding the scope of the CISG 
beyond its borders.145 UPICC, PECL or TLP may not be used as gap-filler, 
if an issue is outside the scope of the CISG as there simply is no gap to 
fill. 
On one hand, the instruments themselves do not prohibit their use 
as gap-fillers of the CISG. The Preamble of UPICC states that the 
Principles “may be used to interpret or supplement international uniform law 
instruments”. In the official comments to the Preamble it is described that 
adjudicators increasingly apply UPICC to interpret and supplement such 
                                                        
140 Neumann, Roots and Fruits (n 104) 68-69. 
141 Pilar Perales Viscasillas, ‘The Role of the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL in the 
Interpretation and Gap-filling of CISG’ in André Janssen and Olaf Meyer CISG 
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142 John Felemegas, An International Approach to the Interpretation of the United Nations 
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143 Felemegas, International Approach (n 142) 35, 38. 
144 Regarding UPICC and PECL see Viscasillas, UPICC and PECL (n 141) 288; Regarding 
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instruments with reference to autonomous and internationally uniform 
principles, an approach expressed in Art. 7 CISG.146 Such instruments 
must include the CISG.147 PECL equally in Art. 1:101(4), although less 
clearly, indicate that they may be used as a tool of interpretation or gap-
filler, by stating that they may “provide a solution to the issue raised where the 
system or rules of law applicable do not do so”.148 TLP have no such general 
provision proclaiming its use, but it has been argued that TLP may equally 
be used “to allow for an autonomous interpretation of and for the filling of internal 
gaps in international conventions and other uniform law instruments”.149  
On the other hand, some scholars disagree on the role of UPICC in 
the interpretation and gap-filling of the CISG, but it seems that not much 
attention is generally being paid to PECL.150 Also in case law it seems that 
much more attention is given to UPICC than PECL.151 Interestingly, even 
less attention is given to TLP.152  
Some scholars argue that no external principles, such as the above 
mentioned, rather than principles derived from the CISG itself, should be 
used to interpret or gap-fill. It is argued that they are not to be considered 
principles on which the CISG is based because they were drafted later than 
the CISG. The CISG cannot be based on a set of rules not existing at the 
time of its drafting.153  
Other scholars do find that instruments such as UPICC are to be 
considered underlying principles, since they are considered expressions of 
general principles of international commercial contracts.154 It is argued that 
due to similarities in the origin and substance of these instruments and the 
CISG, and due to a common purpose of unifying international 
commercial law, the temporal mismatch in regard to the different points 
in time they were drafted, should not hinder their use. The reference to 
principles on which the CISG “is based” should be subject to a broader 
interpretation.155 It is argued that the search for general principles of the 
                                                        
146 UPICC, pp. 4-5, Preamble, comment 5. 
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CISG should not be limited to those which can be derived from the CISG 
itself, due to the need to have regard for its international character in 
accordance with Art. 7(1) CISG.156  
As a position in between these two polar opposites, some scholars 
have more cautiously argued that instruments such as UPICC are not 
always, but nonetheless sometimes, applicable in interpreting or gap-filling 
the CISG, or that they may be applied to determine the meaning of an 
underlying principle,157  such as good faith.158 These instruments might be 
useful and could be applied to support the CISG, but not to add additional 
features to it.159 UPICC, or other such instruments, may be used to 
interpret or gap-fill the CISG to the extent that the matter is governed by, 
but not settled in it, and that the relevant provision is to be considered an 
expression of a principle underlying both UPICC and the CISG.160 Despite 
the diverging scholarly opinions regarding the applicability of soft law 
instruments to interpret or gap-fill, adjudicators do not seem to pay much 
attention to theoretical distinctions as to when the instruments are 
applicable, but often uses UPICC without justifying on which grounds 
they are applicable.161  
It may not be possible to conclude that UPICC, PECL or TLP are 
always or never applicable when interpreting the CISG in accordance with 
Art. 7(1) or when gap-filling in accordance with Art. 7(2). A case-by-case 
assessment must, therefore, determine their applicability. UPICC, PECL 
and TLP all have general provisions requiring parties to act in accordance 
with good faith in UPICC Art. 1.7, PECL Art. 1:201 and TLP no. I.1.1. 
Although no exact definition of this duty is provided, they all furthermore 
provide examples of what it means to act in ‘bad faith’ or ‘contrary to good 
faith’ in UPICC Art. 2.1.15, PECL Art. 2:301 and TLP no. IV.8.1. 
Since the prevailing view is that soft law instruments may be used to 
interpret or gap-fill the CISG to the extent that the relevant provision is 
to be considered an expression of a principle underlying both the soft law 
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instrument and the CISG,162  it must be assessed whether UPICC Art. 
2.1.15, PECL Art. 2:301 and TLP no. IV.8.1 are expressions of principles 
also underlying the CISG. It may be argued that this is the case with 
reference to these provisions being expressions of a general duty to act in 
good faith also expressed in UPICC, PECL, and TLP and that such a duty 
may be considered a general principle on which the CISG is also based.163  
It has been described, that there are provisions in such soft law 
instruments that are to be considered “fleshing out bones already present in the 
skeletal structure of the uniform law”, and that there are provisions that have 
“bones and accompanying flesh” that may not be fixed to the uniform law in 
question164. In the first instance, the soft law instruments relevant may be 
used to interpret and gap-fill the CISG. They may often provide 
comments and illustrations, that may contribute to the understanding of 
the CISG, and thereby fleshing out its bones. With regard to the second 
instance, it is more doubtful whether they may be used to interpret and 
gap-fill.165 It must, therefore, be assessed whether one is merely filling out 
details missing in the CISG, or trying to force something into it that has 
no basis in the CISG itself. It could be argued, that UPICC Art. 2.1.15, 
PECL Art. 2:301 and TLP no. IV.8.1 are fleshing out the bones of the 
CISG, in the sense that good faith is an underlying principle, being one of 
the bones in the CISG. The soft law instruments and the accompanying 
comments and examples could then be used to flesh out that bone. On 
the other hand, it is questionable whether the duty to act in good faith may 
be extended to the precontractual phase, especially considered the 
legislative history. In that sense, it could be considered an attempt to force 
new bones and accompanying flesh into the already fully boned skeleton 
that is the CISG. During the drafting of the CISG, precontractual liability 
was thoroughly discussed, but the drafters decided not to include an 
express provision. Therefore, it is persuasive to consider the inclusion of 
such liability as an attempt to force new bones into the CISG. Whether 
this should be allowed depends on whether one advocates letting the 
CISG evolve and expand in scope to let it adapt to new developments and 
thereby letting the CISG skeleton grow. 
UPICC has been referred to as a private codification or ‘restatement’ 
of international contract law,166 however, UPICC do not only represent 
tradition but also innovation. To the extent that UPICC do not follow a 
common core of principles already generally accepted, but rather express 
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the solution the drafters found to be the best, they instead become a 
‘prestatement’.167 The adjudicator must pay attention to which provisions 
are mere ‘restatements’ and which are ‘prestatements’. A ‘prestatement’ 
may not necessarily be applicable when gap-filling the CISG. The above 
quoted provisions regarding precontractual liability may be considered 
such ‘prestatements’,168 since no similar provisions are to be found in the 
CISG, and have been referred to as the “most spectacular deviation from the 
CISG template”.169 Although the provisions deviate from the CISG 
template, a common core could have developed, so that while the 
provisions may have been prestatements to begin with, they could over 
time become restatements. 
There are some provisions in the above described soft law rules, 
which are familiar to civil law systems, but not recognised in common law 
systems, as well as the other way around.170 The precontractual liability 
described in UPICC, PECL and TLP resembles the civil law approach 
rather than the common law approach.171 Even if the CISG may evolve, it 
should only do so as far as to resemble an international common core.172  
It may be too much of a stretch to let such a broad concept of 
precontractual liability, as described in UPICC, PECL, and TLP, be 
encompassed, when this does not reflect either what was agreed at the 
drafting stage or an international common core. 
In civil law systems, good faith as a basis for imposing precontractual 
liability is generally acknowledged, either by statutory law or general 
principles of law.173 The approach adopted by most civil law systems is the 
doctrine of ‘culpa in contrahendo’174 which has been generally defined as 
a duty to “deal in good faith with each other during the negotiation stage, or else face 
liability, customarily to the extent of the wronged party’s reliance.”175 Such a general 
duty to act in good faith during negotiations has not been recognised as a 
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basis for imposing liability in common law systems.176 Common law 
countries have, however, moved towards acknowledging some types of 
precontractual duties to act in good faith, for instance in the U.S. courts 
have recognised three types of precontractual duties. First, 
misrepresentation, which involves misinformation as to the intent to come 
to an agreement. Secondly, promissory estoppel, which involves a promise 
which the other party has detrimentally relied upon, and thirdly, unjust 
enrichment, which involves restitution of benefits gained during the 
negotiations.177 Common for both civil law and common law systems is, 
however, that no liability is imposed for merely breaking off 
negotiations.178 It is not the purpose of this article to investigate the 
differences in the civil law and common law approaches, nor to point out 
the specific situations in which a party would be held liable under either 
of these approaches. It is furthermore not the purpose of this article to 
examine to what extent there is an international common core regarding 
precontractual liability and the specific prerequisites required to impose 
liability under such common core. It will therefore merely be pointed out 
that such differences in the domestic approaches and the extent of an 
international common core must affect the extent to which precontractual 
liability may be imposed under the CISG. It may be argued that the CISG 
may only develop to let precontractual liability be imposed under the 
Convention to the extent that it reflects what is commonly acknowledged 
internationally. 
Since an amendment of the CISG would be lengthy and difficult it 
would be preferable to let the CISG develop to stay in line with a common 
core in international trade, instead of risking having a uniform law 
instrument that may become outdated. It would be preferable if 
adjudicators were able to determine the extent of an international 
common core regarding precontractual liability, and to only impose 
liability to such extent, but that would certainly be a difficult task. It has 
been argued that although there is different terminology in domestic laws 
concerning precontractual liability the result of the case may in many 
situations be the same,179 and therefore it may be reasonable to apply 
UPICC Art. 2.1.15, PECL Art. 2:301 and TLP no. IV.8.1 as a possible 
expression of such common core. To have regard to the need to promote 
uniformity in the application of the CISG, it would seem preferable if 
adjudicators looked to acknowledged international instruments easily 
                                                        
176 Allan Farnsworth, ‘Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing 
and Failed Negotiations’ 87 Columbia Law Review no. 2, Mar., 1987 217-294, 222; 
Goderre, Negotiations (n 4) 270; Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 268. 
177 Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability (n 176) 222; Goderre, Negotiations (n 4) 270; Novoa, 
Culpa in Contrahendo (n 173) 288, note 21; Regarding unjust enrichment and estoppel see 
Spagnolo, Pandora’s Box (n 12) 268. 
178 Schwenzer/Hachem/Kee, Global Sales (n 1) 280. 
179 Schwenzer/Hachem/Kee, Global Sales (n 1) 278; Goderre, Negotiations (n 4) 266; 
Kessler/Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo (n 175) 401. 
28                      PRECONTRACTUAL LIABILITY IN THE CISG 
 
accessible rather than to find inspiration in the adjudicators own domestic 
law. To promote uniformity in the application of the CISG, adjudicators 
must unanimously apply the same sources and in this regard UPICC, 
PECL and TLP provide a helpful tool. 
3.3.2 GOOD FAITH IN LIGHT OF SOFT LAW 
If the provisions in UPICC, PECL, and TLP are applied to fill out 
the content of the duty to act in good faith during the negotiations, the 
content of these provisions must be discerned. Common is that they all 
make it clear, that the parties are free to negotiate and will not generally 
be held liable for the mere failure to reach an agreement. This is in line 
with a general principle of freedom of contract.180 This freedom is 
however not unlimited, since it must not conflict with good faith.181 What 
can at least be considered common in regard to UPICC Art. 2.1.15, PECL 
Art. 2:301 and TLP no. IV.8.1 is that the situations encompassed require 
behaviour in bad faith, behaviour contrary to good faith or some kind of 
negligence. This is in line with the fact that it has internationally been 
recognised that merely breaking off negotiations does not impose liability. 
These considerations would therefore also apply if precontractual liability 
were to be imposed under the CISG on the basis of Art. 7 and the notion 
of good faith. Common is furthermore, that a party who negotiates or 
breaks off negotiations in bad faith, or contrary to good faith, is liable for 
the losses caused to the other party. UPICC, PECL and TLP all prescribe 
the same express example of what in particular will be considered bad faith 
or behavior contrary to good faith; to enter into or continue negotiations 
with no intention to reach an agreement. 
UPICC 2016 comments provide further examples and illustrations 
of such acts. For instance entering into negotiations with the sole purpose 
of preventing the other party from contracting with a competitor, but not 
itself wishing to contract.182 The comments to UPICC furthermore 
describe that it will be bad faith to deliberately or by negligence mislead 
the other party, either by actually misrepresenting facts or by not 
disclosing facts which should have been disclosed.183 This would, for 
instance, be if a party continues negotiations while knowing of 
circumstances that would prevent the conclusion or fulfillment of the 
contract but not disclosing such information.184 TLP is worded a bit 
differently than UPICC and PECL explicitly mentioning that the other 
party must be left with the justified assumption that a contract would be 
concluded, and exemplifies that it is bad faith if a party insists on so clearly 
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unreasonable terms so that a contract could not be expected to be 
concluded, in case that party gains an advantage from such behavior.185  
These are merely examples of what negotiating in bad faith or contrary to 
good faith is. There may be situations that would equally qualify as such 
behaviour although not encompassed by the provided examples, and these 
less clear situations are difficult to discern. It is exactly one of the issues 
of good faith and precontractual liability, that even if the precontractual 
phase is considered within the scope of the CISG, the determination of 
the precise content of the duty to act in good faith during the negotiations 
is difficult. Even if soft law instruments can be consulted as means to 
determine the content of the duty to act in good faith, it is still not clear 
exactly what behaviour would result in liability. There does not seem to be 
any case law where precontractual liability has been imposed under the 
CISG, with or without the use of soft law instruments,186  why it would be 
impossible exhaustively and in detail to describe the content of such 
potential liability. It could be helpful to examine case law concerning 
precontractual liability under UPICC, PECL, and TLP in constructing a 
clarification of the content of the duty to act in good faith during the 
negotiations, but this is beyond the framework of this article. 
4. CONCLUSION 
In the introduction it was asked; would it not be in accordance with 
the purpose of the CISG, which is to remove legal barriers in international 
trade and promote uniformity and certainty, to let the scope of the CISG 
reach as far as possible and thereby encompass a precontractual liability 
broader than mere liability for wrongful revocation of an offer? However, 
when answering this question it becomes clear that it must be taken into 
consideration that the concept of uniformity has two aspects and that 
promoting formal uniformity might entail the risk of decreasing 
substantive uniformity. 
The question of whether precontractual liability may be imposed 
under the CISG, besides liability for wrongful revocation of an offer, is 
not to be answered by a simple yes or no. The question must be answered 
having regard to the international character of the CISG, the need to 
promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in 
international trade in accordance with Art. 7(1) CISG. 
A basis for precontractual liability under the CISG may follow from 
an interpretation of the notion of good faith as expressed in Art 7(1) or 
by considering good faith to be an underlying principle of the CISG in 
accordance with Art. 7(2). The main obstacle when determining whether 
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precontractual liability may be imposed under the CISG is whether it is 
within its scope and thereby whether a duty to act in good faith may be 
extended to the precontractual phase. This is doubtful. One of the main 
issues in this regard is that the phase prior to offer and acceptance is not 
clearly governed by the CISG. Another issue is that the drafters considered 
including an express provision providing for precontractual liability, but 
rejected such. This indicates a deliberate exclusion from the scope of the 
CISG. To overcome the issue, one must allow the CISG to evolve and 
expand in scope to keep up with the international development in trade 
and sales law. Whether precontractual liability will be considered within 
the scope of the CISG will therefore mainly depend on whether the 
legislative history is considered decisive, or whether instead the CISG is 
interpreted extensively and allowed to evolve to encompass such liability. 
There must be limits to the extent to which the CISG should be allowed 
to evolve in areas originally expressly excluded and given the lengthy 
discussions and disagreement on good faith and precontractual liability, 
the CISG should not be allowed to evolve to encompass precontractual 
liability. The road to precontractual liability goes through the uncertainties 
as to scope, as to the role of good faith as an interpretative tool, and as to 
the existence of, and contents of, a principle of good faith. Letting the 
CISG encompass precontractual liability beyond the one situation covered 
by Art. 16 could endanger the uniformity instead of enhancing it. 
Considering that including precontractual liability per se under the scope 
of the CISG stands on debated and debatable views on scope, 
interpretation, and principles, the present authors conclude that there is 
not enough sturdy footing for such a view. 
If one despite this should find that precontractual liability is within 
the scope of the CISG it is suggested that precontractual liability may only 
be imposed to the extent that an international common core is discernible. 
As an international common core might be difficult to discern, 
adjudicators must consider the same sources to promote uniformity in the 
application of the CISG. In this regard UPICC, PECL or TLP provide 
helpful tools to fill out the missing details in the CISG, but only to the 
extent that such does not expand the scope of the CISG. But even with 
the help from soft law instruments, the content of precontractual liability 
is difficult to define. However, what can surely be concluded is that the 
mere withdrawal from negotiations will not impose liability. There must 
be an act in bad faith, contrary to good faith or some kind of negligence 
involved. Further details of such liability are difficult to determine, and 
since no case law exists to fill in the blanks, a definitive answer does not 
exist.  
Whether the CISG can encompass precontractual liability is one 
among many interesting discussions when it comes to the CISG. While 
the present authors remain critical towards considering precontractual 
liability within the scope of the CISG, the answer is far from simple and 
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may change over time as the dynamic doctrine is a more fruitful approach 
than a restrive one. 
This paper mainly focused on Art 16(2) CISG and Art. 7 CISG in 
relation to precontractual liability under the CISG because these 
provisions may provide a basis for precontractual liability under the 
Convention. However, other provisions in the CISG may also to some 
extent be relevant to this discussion of precontractual liability. 
Art. 8 CISG must be utilised to interpret the statements and conduct 
of a party. Statements and conduct of a party must be interpreted 
according to his intent or the understanding of a reasonable person 
according to Art. 8(1) and 8(2). Statements and conduct of a party during 
the negotiations may lead the other party to rely on such and to assume a 
serious intent to reach an agreement, and consequently suffer a loss due 
to such reliance when the other party withdraws from the negotiations.187 
Art. 8 is therefore a necessary part of the equation in determining whether 
a party may be held liable under the CISG in conjunction with art. 7.188 
All things considered, it is concluded that the CISG does in fact deal 
with one specific situation of what could be classified as precontractual 
liablity according to Art. 16. However, the Convention is generally not 
able to deal with all situations of precontractual liablity as the legal grounds 
for allowing it to is too erratic. For situations not covered by Art. 16, one 
must therefore rely on the otherwise applicable domestic law. 
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